The Electoral Commission (EC) is one of Ghana’s most important democratic institutions. Consequently, appointments to its leadership often attract public scrutiny, particularly when questions arise about the political affiliations of individuals selected for key positions. While such concerns deserve attention, it is important to distinguish between political affiliation and evidence of electoral manipulation. The credibility of an election should not rest solely on public perceptions of the people managing it, but also on the strength of the safeguards designed to protect the electoral process.
The controversy surrounding political appointments to electoral institutions raises a fundamental question: how can Ghana strengthen public confidence in the independence and integrity of its elections? The concern is not necessarily that every politically affiliated appointee will act improperly, but that perceived partisanship can undermine public trust. Electoral credibility therefore requires transparent appointments, effective oversight and procedures that allow electoral activities to be independently examined.
It is important to recognise that elections involve several processes and actors, including electoral officials, political party agents, security personnel, observers and voters. The political sympathies of an individual do not automatically translate into the ability to manipulate election results. Rather than assuming misconduct based on affiliation, Ghana must focus on building institutional safeguards that make electoral manipulation more difficult and enable credible allegations to be investigated using verifiable evidence.
International experience demonstrates that cameras can form part of electoral monitoring arrangements. India, for example, uses video cameras, CCTV and webcasting to monitor selected polling stations and important electoral processes. These arrangements have included monitoring activities at polling stations and the storage and counting of election materials. In Bangladesh, CCTV cameras were also deployed extensively at polling centres ahead of the February 2026 parliamentary election, according to reports on electoral preparations. These examples demonstrate that camera-based monitoring is a practical option for electoral authorities, although the technologies, coverage and purposes differ between countries. Ghana can draw lessons from these experiences while assessing which approaches are appropriate for its own electoral system.
Ghana should therefore consider installing secure CCTV systems at polling stations across the country. With approximately 41,000 polling stations, the initiative would require substantial planning, funding and technical capacity. Properly designed systems could provide an additional layer of documentation by recording selected activities at polling stations, particularly processes where disputes are likely to arise. The objective would not be to replace existing electoral procedures, but to strengthen the evidence available when questions emerge about what happened during voting and counting.
The potential benefit of such a system is its capacity to support the prompt examination of reported discrepancies. Where an allegation concerns an incident captured on camera, the relevant footage could be preserved, retrieved and reviewed alongside polling station result sheets, official records, witness accounts and other available evidence. This could help electoral authorities and other authorised bodies establish the facts more quickly and make better-informed decisions. However, CCTV footage should not automatically be treated as conclusive proof of electoral wrongdoing; its significance would depend on what it captures and how it is assessed within the broader evidence.
The financial implications of installing CCTV equipment at thousands of polling stations would need careful consideration. For illustration, an assumed cost of GH¢2,000 per station would amount to approximately GH¢82 million for 41,000 stations, while GH¢5,000 per station would amount to GH¢205 million. These figures are hypothetical calculations, not verified market prices, and may exclude installation, maintenance, storage, staffing and other operational expenses. A feasibility study would therefore be necessary to establish realistic costs, assess available technologies and determine whether a nationwide rollout or a phased pilot programme would be more appropriate.
CCTV, however, is not a complete solution to electoral disputes. The principal area that cameras should not capture is the interior of the voting booth or the voting screen where a voter marks their ballot. This is essential to protect ballot secrecy and ensure that voters can make their choices freely, without fear of intimidation or surveillance. Cameras could instead be positioned to monitor activities outside the voting booth, including the movement of electoral materials, the conduct of officials, the management of queues and other relevant activities during voting and counting. Properly positioned cameras could therefore provide substantial oversight without revealing how individual voters cast their ballots. Nevertheless, cameras may fail, lose power or fail to capture an incident clearly. CCTV should complement, rather than replace, established electoral safeguards and dispute-resolution mechanisms.
Any proposed CCTV system would require clear rules governing access, storage, preservation, review and disclosure of footage. Independent oversight would be necessary to protect recordings from unauthorised access, alteration or selective publication. Procedures should specify who may request footage, how quickly relevant recordings must be preserved after a complaint, and which authorised body would review them. These safeguards would help prevent the technology itself from becoming another source of political controversy or a tool for intimidation and misinformation.
More broadly, strengthening electoral transparency requires a comprehensive approach. The Electoral Commission should continue to promote transparent procedures, accurate documentation of polling station results and clear channels for investigating complaints. Political parties should be able to exercise their legitimate roles through accredited agents, while observers and other authorised stakeholders should have appropriate opportunities to scrutinise the process. Where disputes arise, institutions must respond fairly, promptly and consistently, with decisions grounded in verifiable evidence. International experiences from India and Bangladesh provide useful lessons for Ghana, but any adoption should be guided by local conditions, cost, privacy protections and independent evaluation.
Ultimately, public confidence in Ghana’s elections cannot be secured through assurances alone. It requires institutions whose work can be scrutinised and whose decisions can withstand independent examination. Ghana should consider the feasibility of CCTV-supported electoral monitoring through an independent technical assessment and carefully designed pilot programme. Such an initiative must protect ballot secrecy, respect privacy and operate alongside existing safeguards. Where a reported discrepancy is captured on camera, the relevant footage could be retrieved and reviewed to help establish the facts and support a timely decision by the appropriate authorities. The central objective should be to move Ghana’s electoral debate from suspicion to verification, ensuring that allegations are examined fairly, evidence is assessed objectively and public trust is strengthened through transparency and accountability.
By Dr. Hayford Yeboah, Executive Director of Migration Web Africa (MIWA)








































